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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
The People’s Republic of China (hereon China) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (hereon 
Vietnam) share an inseparable history periodically coloured by collaboration and cordiality and by 
subjugation and hostility that stretches as far back as the first century BC. Armed conflict over 
territorial frontiers remains a stubborn feature of Sino-Vietnamese relations, with three long and 
bloody border wars fought in the latter century alone. It is no coincidence that the last skirmish to 
erupt between Hanoi and Beijing was sparked by conflicting rights in 1988 to a string of islets in the 
South China Sea (SCS). The resultant death of 64 Vietnamese servicemen and the Chinese capture of 
Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands is still considered a blow to the national pride.1   
While China-Vietnam tensions at sea are hardly a novel phenomenon, in the post-war era, their 
overlapping declarations of territorial sovereignty in the SCS have become more than the sum of 
their parts. From the unification of Vietnam in 1975, they have succinctly captured the core and 
evolving national interests and identities; security dilemmas; domestic and economic pressures of 
both nations and of several other third parties at once, all within a permanent locale and without 
any obvious arbiter. Le Luong Minh, General-Secretary for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) and a former Vietnamese foreign minister was not exaggerating when he remarked 
that the SCS problematic is “not just about competing claims but about peace and stability in the 
region”.2 
This being the case, it seems appropriate that scholars of modern Vietnamese foreign policy and the 
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) consistently (although not exclusively) view Vietnam’s bilateral 
behaviour with China in the SCS as a proving ground for hypotheses seeking to explain and forecast 
the rationale of its foreign policy. Bouyed by the restoration of neighbourly ties with China 
throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s many commentators in the early 21st Century have been, 
and indeed still are, optimistic for Sino-Vietnamese relations. Evidenced by increasingly robust 
confrontations in the period after 2005, Vietnam’s growing determination to challenge Chinese 
territorial affronts over the Paracel and Spratly islands has instead seen bilateral relations sour 
dramatically.  
Many studies on SCS security to date have been preoccupied with assessing the behaviour and 
activity of the greater power - with some justification. But comprehending exactly why and the way 
in which Vietnam counters China’s territorial assertiveness in the SCS now and whether it has done 
so peacefully can offer observers an accurate picture not simply of Vietnam’s perception of itself but 
also of the prospects for wider regional security. Scholars must accept that to do so requires a 
relinquishing of certain IR narratives and orthodoxies that have worked for evaluating the conduct of 
other global powers in the past but are less suited to accommodate the unique domestic 
implications and elite-preferences behind Vietnam’s foreign policy with China.    
                                                             
1
 Staff writer. “Vietnamese activists remember 1988 Spratly Islands clash with China”. Agence France 
Press,March 14, 2016. Retrieved 14.05.2016.  
2
 Staff writer. “ASEAN Upbeat on Progress on South China Sea”. Global Times, April 25, 2013. 
Retrieved 14.05.2016.  
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Research objective and structure 
Most realist and neo-liberalist narratives that traditionally have occupied the lion’s share of 
literature concerning Sino-Vietnamese relations tacitly acknowledge that there have been few 
seismic changes to Vietnam’s balance of power or material circumstance vis-à-vis China between 
2000 and 2010. Undeniably though, the tense state of affairs that is obvious today, was not so at the 
start of the 21st Century. The verdicts they reach on what appears to be a Vietnamese foreign policy 
in transition, converge around classical notions of dynamic hedging, and anti-China band-wagoning. 
These schools do not appear to satisfactorily explain the reality of Vietnam’s new-found confidence 
to confront the longstanding Chinese presence in the SCS. One assumption that has been convenient 
to many such theories, as we will see, is the homogeneity and black boxing of Vietnam’s single party 
system. Yet given the VCP’s central function for Vietnamese statecraft, it seems a closer look at the 
impact of the political domestic landscape is warranted 
This paper advocates, the uptick in SCS tensions in the mid-2000s are at least in part the outcome of 
a fluid construction of Vietnam’s attitude towards China at the top echelons of VCP policy-making 
which are in turn sensitive to conflicting policy elite preferences; ideological sway; economic 
considerations and public sentiment.  
That said, it is in addition rather than in lieu of known interests, that the complicated interplay 
between ideational factors and individual agents should be incorporated into the equation. To that 
end, this paper sets out to accomplish several things; in Chapter 3 - to offer an account of the issues 
at the heart of the SCS Sino-Vietnamese dispute. In Chapter 4, the purpose is to explore the VCP 
foreign policy process and layout evidence for a Vietnamese foreign policy in flux, outlining when 
and in what ways Vietnam has changed tack in its approach to China in the SCS. Finally, Chapter 5 
offers an interpretive case for this transition by uncovering the conflicting perceptions and attitudes 
jostling to shape the country’s SCS policy process with China.  
Research method 
This study emphasises the causality link between factional struggle in the VCP and the strategies and 
of Vietnam’s management of Chinese assertion in the SCS; the independent and dependent variables 
respectively. The time frame spans the experience of Vietnamese-Sino relations since 2000 honing in 
on the Vietnamese side alone. Although attention is paid primarily to events in the SCS, other realms 
of Vietnamese foreign affairs, for instance economic cooperation and defence spending patterns are 
also considered. The focus of study on this single unit adequately bound in time and space provides 
a clear and specific level of analysis for the research.3 
On foreign policy analysis, a qualitative single case study approach is deployed primarily for its 
suitability in illustrating concisely the explanatory nature of events inherent in the research question 
and outlined in the research scope. The case study methodology also allows for direct observations 
                                                             
3
 Klotz, A. 2009. „Case Selection‟, In Qualitative Methods in International Relations, Klotz, A. and 
Prakash, D. Eds., Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, MacMillan, p. 43. 
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of the independent and dependent variables as well as room to build an in-depth picture of 
Vietnamese foreign policy “within its real-life context”4.  
Both primary and secondary sources of Vietnam’s engagements with China in the SCS have been 
selected, the former comprising Government statements, VCP policy papers the latter comprising 
books and other academic works. Analysing these sources will necessitate some use of process 
tracing for which the single case study is also well matched.5 In this way, the hypothesis hinges in 
short, on the expectation that infighting over priorities within the VCP is as big if not more a 
determinant of Vietnam’s approach to Chinese territorial aggression than rational cost benefit-
seeking behaviour as seen through a rationalist lens. This statement might be falsified by the 
discovery of a consistent and static foreign policy that is more responsive to material self interests 
rather than qualitative factors like domestic pressure or and ideological values.6 The theoretical 
thrust of the paper falls broadly under a constructivist-interpretive category of International 
Relations (IR) although assumptions that belong to the realist camp are too acknowledged.  
Without the requirement for fieldwork, ethical considerations are unlikely to trouble the research. 
Secrecy in foreign policy and security affairs is endemic but doubly so in the closed communist state. 
Post-positivist understandings of Sino-Vietnamese relations are thus frustrated by the party’s rigid 
control and manipulation of information exchange. By necessity and with regret, inferences drawn 
from qualitative assessments of Vietnamese foreign policy are bound to contain some limitations, 
although not so much as to fundamentally undermine the data presented below.  
 
Chapter 2 Literature Review  
 
 
Conflicting SCS territorial claims and their impact on state-making and state strategies in Southeast 
Asia across the centuries has inspired a rich collection of intellectual material in Western and Asian 
libraries. Although the range and disposition of literature dealing with the politics of the SCS are 
exhaustive, many local and international (especially American) discourses share a common theme. 
Understanding the phenomenon of SCS disputes is very often equated to understanding - sometimes 
exclusively - the behaviour and status of the region’s predominant power - China. By contrast, it is 
not unusual for the foreign policies and sovereignty claims of smaller coastal nations, like Vietnam, 
to be dealt with in a chapter or two or bundled under a broad stroke ASEAN category. Whether or 
not this speaks more of the discipline of IR itself, theorists concerned with SCS security are much 
more likely to overlook the distinctive perspectives of Southeast Asian states to attend first to 
looming Sino-US relations. Unsurprisingly, a disproportionate volume of time and resources have 
been dedicated to evaluating interactions with other SCS territorial powers from the Chinese side 
rather than the other way around.  
                                                             
4
 Yin, R. 2009. Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, p. 
14. 
5
 Van Evera, S. 1997. „What are Case Studies? How should they be performed?‟,in Guide to Methods 
for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. p. 65. 
6
 Ibid. p. 56.  
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In the 21st Century, a score of mainly American but also European and even fewer Vietnamese 
scholars and think-tank experts, many originating from government or policy fields have dominated 
the conversation on China and Vietnam’s SCS policies. Below maps the standpoints of some of the 
most salient and specialised voices among their number.  
One theory which has had a major influence on discussions of Sino-Vietnamese SCS friction was put 
forward by Virginia university’s Brantly Womack in 2006, which posits that Vietnam’s relationship 
with China has persistently been shaped by assymetrical structures. Womack argues that 
“disparities in capacities create systemic differences in 
interests and perspectives between stronger and weaker sides”7 where the greater power is by 
definition less likely to feel vulnerable to bilateral security threats but the inverse is true for the 
smaller state. Vietnam by consequence will always be more “prone to paranoia”8 than its neighbour, 
so helping to crystalise divergent SCS threat perceptions and raise the chances for miscalculation. 
Normalcy in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship is as such incapable of fundamentally changing this 
rationale. Recalling a Waltzian world of international anarchy and relative gains, at best Vietnam is 
able to preserve peace and SCS stability through a combination of tried and tested coping 
techniques for instance delegating disputes to lower ranked officials or increasing party-to-party 
exchanges. Critics will note that the majority of Womack’s prescriptions already exist and if anything 
have been fortified over time yet fail to deliver the promised affects during peaking tensions. 
His interpretation was nevertheless endorsed by another realist and one of academia’s most prolific 
Vietnam experts. U.S. policy analyst, Carlyle Thayer of the Australian Defence Force Academy 
believes that Vietnam has been able to ward off Chinese expansionism within its territorial claims 
through a paradoxical system of cooperation and struggle. Author of some of the most detailed 
studies on Vietnam’s China-focused SCS policies to date, Thayer uses this model to explain how in 
the early 2000’s Vietnam was able to balance and profit from warming friendships with both China 
and the U.S. simultaneously9. In a partial departure from Womack’s theory of assymetry, Thayer 
allows space for ideational politics and the domestic front albeit under the realist banner. In a 1994 
paper Thayer claimed Vietnam’s security dilemmas encountered in the SCS and the stability of the 
single-party regime are one and the same; “the ruling elites perceive the survival of their regime as 
being congruent with their own country's vital national security interests”.10 While Thayer’s writings 
on state and VCP interests have taken a centre stage in the discourse, few peers have questioned his 
hypotheses or sought to thoroughly test out their assumption.11 A contemporary and critical 
response cognisant of the ideational criteria and human agency that Thayer acknowledges is sorely 
needed.  
 
 
                                                             
7
 Womack, B. 2006. China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 17.  
8
 Ibid. p. 20.  
9
  Thayer, C. The Tyranny of Geography. p. 16.  
10
 Thayer, C. (1994). “Sino-Vietnamese Relations: The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest”. 
Asian Survey, 34(6), p. 524.  
11
 Ibid. 525.  
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Founder of the Journal of Comparative Asian Development and Hong Kong based political scientist 
Joseph Cheng advocates what has long been a favourite realist interpretation of Vietnam’s approach 
to China – that of “strategic hedging”12. Vietnam’s desire to resist China’s SCS expansionism must be 
calculated against its hard-won cooperative economic ties with Beijing, which ironically are 
supposed to act themselves as a restraining force on territorial disputes. Although Cheng is able to 
ontologically tell the state from the VCP, his argument, taken straight from the realist playbook, 
rests on the pre-eminence of regime interests13. A long and varied list of promising and alternative 
influencers, like historic animosity, anti-Chinese sentiment or elite preferences are overridden in 
Cheng’s mind by the party’s need to survive.  
Professor at Upsalla University, Ramses Amer specialises in Southeast Asian conflict resolution and 
has published many insightful essays relating to Vietnam’s SCS disputes with China. A 2004 and 
decidedly neo-liberal assessment of Sino-Vietnamese relations identified the absence of 
“mechanisms and principles regulating behaviour”, as the greatest incentive for Vietnam to behave 
more belligerently towards China. It is suspicious and contradictory that Amer negates the landmark 
2002 SCS Joint Declaration on Conduct (DOC) to settle differences by negotiation14 yet hails similar 
past affirmations as an “increasingly sophisticated and detailed conflict management scheme”.15 A 
concurrent lull in serious SCS incidents from 2000 prompted Amer to conclude at the time that 
bilateral territorial disputes would subside as a security concern for Vietnam.  
His optimism was shared by Ralf Emmers, Associate Dean of the S Rajaratnam School and former 
mentee of the late Michael Leifer, a pioneer of Southeast Asian security studies. In 2007, Emmers 
was responsible for an article prematurely claiming that Sino-Vietnamese institionalised cooperation 
would lead to territorial contests in the SCS being “no longer perceived as a significant security 
flashpoint capable of undermining order in the region”.16 These false hope predictions about 
Vietnam’s actual foreign policy course with China, especially in the period after 2005 diverge from 
parallel developments visible at the VCP level and show the pitfalls of neglecting the impact of the 
domestic realm on foreign policy.  
Quite the opposite and more closely attuned to events on the ground an article by Jessica Weiss and 
John Ciorciari at Yale University’s Political Science Department, warned in 2011 that sovereignty 
conflicts in the SCS have caused Sino-Vietnamese tensions to escalate to their most dangerous levels 
since normalisation. They theorise that Vietnamese foreign policy has transitioned from strategic 
balancing - and the overreliance on enlisting US diplomatic support - to seek to “multilateralise” the 
dispute and band-wagon against China with other ASEAN partners.17 Determination to make SCS 
territorial claims a regional rather than bilateral dispute at the 2011 East Asia Summit has been 
supposedly met with more success than China’s contrary efforts to confine the contest. Although 
                                                             
12
 Cheng, J. (2011). “Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century Economics in 
Command?”. Asian Survey, 51(2), p. 386.  
13
 Ibid. p. 404.  
14
 Amer, R. (2002). “The Sino-Vietnamese Approach to Managing Boundary Disputes”. International 
Boundaries Research Unit: Maritime Briefing, 3(5), p.46.  
15
 Amer, R. (2004). “Assessing Sino-Vietnamese Relations through the management of Contentious 
Issues”. Comtemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 26(2), p. 334.  
16
 Emmers, R. (2007). “The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations”. 
S. Rajaratnam School of International studies, Working paper series no. 129, Singapore, p. 1.  
17
 Weiss, S. and Ciorciari J. (2012). “Sino Vietnamese stand off in the South China Sea”. Georgetown 
Journal of International Affairs, 13(1), p. 64. 
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this explanation can accommodate for adaptability in Hanoi’s management of Beijing, it is an 
extension and circular reinforcement of what Thayer and Womack would characterise as a hard-
nosed assymetric strategy of hedging Chinese and U.S. ties.18 Perhaps an accurate description of 
how, ultimately Weiss and Cioriari are unable to answer the more interesting question of why 
Vietnam has sought to expand its countering of China.   
It is clear and worrying that the discourse of Vietnamese foreign policy is disproportionately 
dominated by American-school IR thought. So far the roster of academics offering hypotheses that 
can move the conversation past realist and neo-liberal perspectives is glaringly short.  
One such attempt has been made unexpectedly by one of the VCP’s own. Nguyen Vu Tung, former 
Deputy Chief at the Vietnamese Embassy in the US and current Professor at the Diplomatic Academy 
of Vietnam, Nguyen advocates for a constructivist re-examination of Vietnam’s relation by observing 
its interactions with ASEAN. In a 2002 journal and again in 2007, he convincingly makes the case that 
Vietnam’s foreign policy is crafted more than anything through, the remoulding of identities and 
leadership learning processes.1920 His work in the Vietnamese-ASEAN field has already yielded novel 
information about foreign policy design inside the VCP but admittedly requires a steady flow of 
publicly available data that is not so forthcoming to the non-government scholar.   
From David Dreyer’s foreign policy analysis of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, some further 
innovative judgements that bridge the theoretical divide of Vietnam’s orientation towards China can 
be drawn. His reasoning is firmly rooted in the conviction that interstate relations correlate not just 
with security interests but also in accordance with “issues spiral” - a dynamic and mutually iterative 
process in which tension increases as multiple issues accumulate.21 Dreyer contends that once an 
initial issue disagreement is formed, an “image of the enemy”.22 Although it is not applied 
specifically to SCS tensions, his typology holds considerable value when examining Vietnam’s 
modern sino-management policies as it is able to link separate factors such as public opinion, 
nationalist animosity and arms racing within one wider theory of Vietnamese foreign policy.  
A 2010 paper focusing on the SCS disputes by Nguyen Nam Duong has also gone some way to 
addressing this gap. Vietnamese foreign policy vis-a-vis China in the SCS is not adequately 
characterised through the realist lens as a means of satisfying a static set of given, largely military, 
national interests but rather as a reflection of Vietnam’s constantly remoulded national identity. 
Vietnamese sabre-rattling and defiance in the SCS - what scholars like Womack and Thayer might 
describe as part of a calculated balancing act - are better understood as the product of a cloudy mix 
of deep-seated ethno-cultural nationalism, pan-Southeast Asian solidarity and of resurgent 
socialism.23  
                                                             
18
 Ibid. p. 65.  
19
 Nguyen, V. (2002). “Vietnam-ASEAN Co-operation after the Cold War and the Continued Search 
for a Theoretical Framework”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24(1), pp. 113 - 115.  
20
 Nguyen, V. (2007). “Vietnam's Membership of ASEAN: A Constructivist Interpretation”. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 29(3), p. 493.  
21
 Dreyer, D. (2010). “One Issue Leads to Another: Issue Spirals and the Sino-Vietnamese War”, 
Foreign Policy Analysis, 6(4), p. 298. 
22
 Ibid. p. 300.  
23
 Nguyen, N. (2010). “Vietnamese Foreign Policy since Doi Moi: The Dialectic of Power and Identity”. 
University of New South Wales, the Australian Defence Force Academy, pp. 94 – 125.  
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Absorbing the limitations of realist discourses, one concludes that what is patently missing in the 
Anglophone conversation on Vietnam are further alternative and current, narratives that can go 
beyond the strict theoretical confinements of rationalist perspectives. The urgency to do specifically 
for Vietnamese foreign policy what the likes of Amitav Acharya, Alexander Wendt and Barry Buzan 
have done for IR in the West and preeminent powers in the Far East is now great. To date only a very 
small collection of academics whose works are unfortunately more obscure, most perhaps not 
incoincidentally originating in Vietnam have responded to this call. Equipped with this 
pronouncement, we now push attention to the central subject of Vietnam-China affairs.   
 
Chapter 3 Vietnam, the South China Sea and 
China 
 
 
The South China Sea problem  
The geography of the SCS ostensibly offers little practical utility, encompassing thousands of reefs, 
rocks, atolls and cays, many submerged at high tide and together comprising just 12.5 km² of 
naturally occurring land.24 25 Perhaps it is surprising then that the heart of the SCS sovereignty 
dispute between China and Vietnam that in recent years has scarcely escaped monthly headlines, 
revolves specifically around rights to the sea’s two major archipelagos; the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) 
Islands and Spratly (Trường Sa) Islands. These two sets of claims are highly complex, muddied by a 
spaghetti bowl of overlapping 3rd party claims, historical contingencies, and the elaborate provisions 
of the United Nations convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which both nations are signed. 
The unopposed legal or de facto control over many of the barely visible SCS islets and rocks 
guarantees a stake of what is a major commercial gateway and potentially rich natural resource hub.  
Almost 11bn barrels of unproven oil reserves are estimated to sit beneath the SCS of which up to 
half is thought to found off the northeast of the contested Spratly Islands.26 Moreover, in 2011, 
nearly a third of the world’s crude oil and over half of all Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) passed through 
shipping lanes within the maritime boundaries of the Spratly Islands27 along with a quarter of global 
trade volumes.28 The littoral territories across the SCS are also abundant in fishing stocks, which 
contribute 8% gross value added to the Vietnamese economy every year29 and account for as much 
                                                             
24
 cia.org World Factbook. “Paracel Islands”. Retrieved 01.06.2016.  
25
 See Hancox, D. and Prescott, V. (1995). “A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands and an 
Account of Hydrographic Surveys Amongst Those Islands”. Maritime Briefing. International 
Boundaries Research Unit. Special Issue. 
26
 US Energy Information Administration (2013). “Contested areas of South China Sea likely have few 
conventional oil and gas resources”.  
27
 US Energy Information Administration (2013). “The South China Sea is an important world energy 
trade route”. 
28
 Glaser, B. “Armed Clash in the South China Sea”. Council on Foreign Relations, Contingency 
Planning Memorandum, no. 14, April 2012.  
29
 Vietnam Briefing. “The Seafood Industry in Vietnam – Aquaculture, Five Year Plans, and the TPP”. 
November 4, 2015.  
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as one-tenth of the annual global catch.30 Vietnam, China and Taiwan already claim Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ) and continental shelves along their SCS seaboards, which according to 
UNCLOS permit special unilateral fishing and hydrocarbon exploration rights within and - dependent 
on the extent of shallow seabed - beyond 200 nautical miles (nm) from the coastal baseline. 
Reducing ambiguity over their claims through diplomacy, sabre-rattling tactics or in the extreme 
although not impossible case, by threat of brute force is therefore of critical strategic value to 
Vietnam and China.  
It is noteworthy that the very first article of Vietnam’s national constitution, revised in 2013, places 
special emphasis on the territorial integrity of Vietnamese coastal waters and islands.31 
Understanding the geopolitical dynamics and values behind this renewed commitment to advance 
and defend Vietnam’s claims reveals clues to determining the moment and nature of Vietnam’s 21st 
Century policy shift from rapprochement to resistance of China in the SCS.    
 The issue of claims  
Composed of 140 banks, shoals and islets about 230 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast, 
Vietnam China and Taiwan all lay claim to the entirety of the Spratly territories, although the smaller 
claims of three other ASEAN nations further complicate matters. 32 The Kalayan group of islands west 
of Palawan is subject to Philippine control claims while Malaysia and Brunei also assert an extended 
continental shelf and EEZ over Spratly features closest to their own coastal peripheries. As a result, 
over 40 geographical features in the Spratly Islands are reported to be occupied by five of the 
claimants, many staking their rights with military-purpose facilities and even an hotel. 33  Vietnam 
represents the greatest presence possessing 21 islets to China’s 7.34  
The Paracel islands lie 200 nautical miles equidistant between Vietnam and Chinese Hainan equalling 
35 islets and shoals.35 Although contested between Vietnam, China and Taiwan, they have been 
occupied solely by China since a short but deadly clash in 1974 saw PLAN forces repel a series of 
South Vietnamese troop landings. China’s official stance denies the existence of there being a 
contest for sovereignty over the Paracels. In 2012 it upgraded Woody Island, the largest Paracel 
territory, to a prefecture-level municipality governed under Hainan Province.36  
The completion in 1994 of Vietnam’s ratification to UNCLOS and the international body’s imposition 
of a deadline for consideration of requests for continental shelves allowed Vietnam to clarify and 
institutionalise its claims. In 2009, Vietnam elicited an angry response from China for submitting two 
requests to UNCLOS for additional continental shelves up to and beyond the Paracels and, jointly 
with Malaysia, for the Spratly Islands.37 38 The initiative may be seen as mainly symbolic or possibly 
                                                             
30
 Rogers, W. “The Role of Natural Resources in the South China Sea” in Cronin M., Ed., Cooperation 
from Strength, p. 89. 
31
 Vietnamese Constitution 2013, Article I. English translation available at   
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/tranlation_of_vietnams_new_constitution_enuk_2.pdf  
32
 Hancox, D. and Prescott, V. “A Geographical Description of the Spratly Islands”. pp. 3 – 30. 
33
 Dzurek, D. (1995). “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who's on First”. Maritime Briefing, International 
Boundaries Research Unit, 2(1), pp. 56 – 57. 
34
 Globalsecurity.org “Territorial claims in the Spratly and Paracel Islands”. Retrieved 24.05.2016.   
35
 Ibid at note 33.   
36
 Staff writer, “China establishes Sansha City”. Xinhua News, August 24, 2012  
37
 un.org, “Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”  
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an attempt to gather international support for Vietnamese claims. This is because it is highly unlikely 
the collection of islands and atolls are capable of meeting the UNCLOS criteria for generating their 
own continental shelves or EEZs. 39 Yet in any case China’s refusal to acknowledge the authority of 
the commission charged with looking at Vietnam’s submissions has enabled Beijing to prolong the 
legally arbitrary but strategically advantageous status quo. Consequently, although never envisioned 
as a silver bullet, UNCLOS guidelines have had precious little impact on untangling the fundamentals 
of conflicting Sino-Vietnamese maritime claims. 40 If anything, the on-going poorly defined legal 
status of the islands has been a useful cover for provocative or otherwise illegal activity such as land 
reclamation and militarised local zones and the, particularly in the Spratly Islands.  
In 2014, the Philippine Department for Foreign Affairs released imagery depicting China’s now 
widespread endeavours to artificially enlarge its possessions in the Spratly Islands. The construction 
of military facilities, ports, and even a 3km air strip at Fiery Cross41, Subi and Mischief Reefs are 
calculated to fortify China’s territorial claims rather than to secure natural resources or fishing 
grounds according to the Asia Maritime Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS).42 The US State department echoed a study by CSIS that showed that while Vietnam 
had too engaged in illegal island building, it gained 80 acres of new land compared to China’s 3000 
acres43 having a much more negative effect on local marine ecosystems and the marine 
environment.  
In the last two years, a flurry of Chinese military activity in the SCS, including the deployment of anti-
ship missiles to the Paracels44 and military PLAN patrols in the Spratlies has inspired a litany of 
increasingly intense protests from Vietnam. Their collective tone and move from multilateral legal 
vehicles like ASEAN or UNCLOS to unilateral threats suggest that Vietnam has reconsidered its tactics 
for managing Chinese territorial assertion.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
38
 un.org, “Chinese response to joint submission made by Malaysia and Viet Nam to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. May 7, 2009.  
39
 Elferink, A. 2014. “Do the coastal states in the South China Sea have a continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles?” Roundtable South China Sea, International Law and UNCLOS, Institute for the 
Law of the Sea, Utrecht University 
40
 Beckman, R. (2013). “UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South 
China Sea”. American Journal of International Law, 107(1), p. 151.  
 
41
 Hardy, J. and O‟Conner, S., “China completes runway on Fiery Cross Reef”. IHS Jane‟ Defence, 
September 25, 2015. Retrieved 13.06.16.  
42
 Watkins, D. “What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea”. New York Times, October 27, 
2015. Retrieved 13.06.16. 
43
 Ibid.   
44
 Panda, A., “South china Sea: China has deployed anti-ship missiles on Woody Island”. The 
Diplomat, March 26, 2016. Retrieved 13.06.16.  
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The Vietnamese Communist Party and Foreign 
Policy Making in Vietnam 
 
 
Decision-making in the communist state of Vietnam is famously opaque and intricate. For all the 
external and internal challenges launched against it, Vietnam is the seat of one of the most enduring 
and stable political regimes in Asia and one of only five remaining communist systems in the world. 
The orthodox assumption of many IR theorists that Vietnam can fit the  single actor model has so far 
yielded largely one-sided and arguably out-moded interpretations for its remarkably flexible SCS 
policies with China. Yet since material concerns and territorial independence do undeniably sway 
Vietnamese strategy, an assessment searching for answers to Vietnam’s changing conduct with 
China should look to synthesise these realist and ideational concerns. Any corresponding conclusions 
therefore are not complete without first lifting the lid on decision making in the Vietnamese state.     
Entrenched by Article 4 of the constitution, the VCP “is the leading force of the State and society”45 
of Vietnam (the distinction between party and state is not made). Because all political competition is 
proscribed in Vietnam, the VCP proper holds absolute responsibility for guiding all national policy, 
foreign relations included. This does not mean however that the foreign policy process is a 
straightforward matter. Top decisions in Vietnam are populated, or more accurately, administered, 
to varying degrees and at different stages by four other main state bodies:  
 The Government, serves as the executive branch of the state and is headed firstly by the 
President and secondly by the Prime Minister whom he appoints. It is made up of 22 
ministries,46 each led by a Minister of which the most important (usually the Ministers for 
National Defence, Public Security and Foreign Affairs) also sit on the Central Committee and 
an even more select few on the Politburo.  
 The 498-strong National Assembly or legislature, on paper, is Vietnam’s highest decision-
making body, comprising elected party cadres from each of Vietnam’s 64 provinces. They in 
turn represent and broker the full array of Vietnam’s socio-economic and culturally 
differentiated political priorities. It holds the Prime Minister to account who in practice has 
final say on the day-to-day decisions of external affairs although anecdotal reports indicate 
this is heavily dependent on the holders’ personality and leadership style47.  
 At the top of the VCP, the 180-member Central Committee holds supreme power, inputting 
the party line in all major decisions of Vietnamese foreign policy. The Central Committee, 
through its various commissions oversees the practical work of government ministries, 
operating an executive veto power to ensure they comply with the party’s official socialist 
ideology. The Central Committee also votes in the Politburo, an elite subunit, yet retains the 
right to override its decrees48.  
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 Observers place responsibility for executive decisions with an elite group of usually 10 – 15 
high ranking party figures who make up the Politburo. Membership for the troika of Party 
General Secretary, President and Prime Minister is guaranteed but the overall composition, 
rank and size of the Politburo is determined by the Central Committee.49 Following elections 
at the 12th National Party Congress in January 2016, the Politburo comprises 19 members.50 
Nominally tied to the outward principle of collective decision making,51 Vietnamese 
governance specialist Zachary Abuza claims Politburo decisions are internally reached in 
spite of factional infighting and ideological differences.52   
An interview based study of the inner-workings of Vietnamese policy-making by Lucius Casey 
reported that even officials within government are not always certain as to how Vietnamese foreign 
policy is designed.53 The constitution singles out the General Secretary, invariably expected to hold 
strong communist credentials, as the most powerful position. Despite serving as the nation’s 
representative abroad, the President, ranked second, is said to hold few real powers while the 
pragmatic role of the Prime Minister is the third most important post.  
Perhaps a technicality to foreign observers, for the Vietnamese public and National Assembly, the 
VCP hierarchical ranking system is highly symbolic of where power lies. Even so, the outward 
responsibilities and rating of Vietnam’s leaders does not necessarily reflect the internal reality of 
foreign policy making in practice. The former and charismatic Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung for 
instance, a champion of liberal economic reforms and closer US ties was perceived as being a greater 
force than President Truong Tan Sang and was as a result, disposed of by the more stalwart VCP 
vanguard in 2016.54 That this rating combination changes from one National Congress to the next 
could indicate that the VCP intermittently flit between prioritising the safeguarding of its socialist 
values and the prioritising of more practical economic or external security concerns.  
Further detailed research would greatly benefit scholars of Vietnamese foreign policy. What this 
chapter aims to illustrate is simply that Vietnam’s single-party system is anything but the unanimous 
decision-making entity so many academics have characterised it as. In light of the fact that decisions 
and power are concentrated within the VCP much more than in democratic systems, the nuances in 
Vietnam’s 21st Century engagement with China from de facto ally to wary partner must be directly 
impinged by policy elites. The next section expounds on the changes that have occurred to make 
such a claim possible. 
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From Rapprochement or Resistance  
 
 
A series of smaller peaks and dives disguise a bigger curve of thawing then cooling Sino-Vietnamese 
relations in the 21st Century. Although the turn cannot perhaps be pinpointed on one event alone, 
below highlights how failure to resolve the SCS problematic has reversed initial predictions of 
economic and political cooperation. Within the last five years particularly, latent resistance and 
defiance in Vietnam’s orientation towards China has bubbled to the surface, triggering increasingly 
aggressive territorial actions and reactions for both nations on the maritime frontier.  
Three years after first being proposed, in November 2002 China alongside Vietnam and nine other 
ASEAN members signed the SCS (DOC). The DOC was a landmark multilateral agreement, in which 
China sacrificed its preference for bilateral frameworks for solving maritime disagreements. The DOC 
has never been legally binding but has been seen by politicians and scholars as a common reference 
point and reassuring political statement during periods of SCS Sino-ASEAN fallout.55  Quick to press 
home the charm offensive,  China and Vietnam accelerated talks of a long awaited maritime 
delimitation and fishing agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin, finally ratified in 2004.56 In 2009 
demarcations of a major land border pact on Vietnam’s northern frontier were completed, closing 
for good, a 30 year old boundary dispute with China.57 
These faith building measures taken just over a decade after official normalisation of relations in 
1990, appeared to bolster what had been an incremental but sincere friendship between China and 
Vietnam. Within that time Vietnam had settled its war with Cambodia, removing a longstanding 
source of mutual mistrust, established official party-to-party meetings and succeeded in averting 
“extended periods of tension” in the SCS.58 A joint summit in 1999 saw General Secretaries Le Kha 
Phieu and Jiang Zemin agreed to work towards "long-term, stable, future orientated, good-
neighbourly and all-round cooperative relations".59 Their words were reaffirmed again by President 
Tran Duc Luong in 2000 with the Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation. 
In 2000, China-Vietnam bilateral trade stood at $2.5bn, already a remarkable leap from the $32 
million recorded in 1991, exploding from $7.2bn in 2005 to $50.1 in 2013.60 This extraordinary spurt 
in trade volumes more than fulfilled a joint 2005 promise to double cross-border trade by 2010.61 In 
2004, Hanoi’s active support for a milestone China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), first 
advanced by China in 2002, was rewarded with Beijing’s endorsement for Hanoi’s accession to the 
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World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the mutual recognition of both countries as “market 
economies”.62 In a clear indication of rejuvenated Sino-Vietnamese camaraderie, the same year, 
China expanded its ‘Early Harvest Programme’ to Vietnam. Economic initiatives for cooperation were 
boosted still in 2005 when $1bn worth of Sino-Vietnamese commercial deals were signed on the 
back of President Luong’s second state visit to China.63  
These stepping stones were justifiably taken as evidence that Vietnam was relegating its territorial 
disputes with China for the sake of diplomatic and economic cooperation by a handful of 
authoritative figures, including Ramses Amer, Carlyle Thayer and Stein Tønnesson. Outward amity 
however belied stirring disquiet inside and outside the party where internal suspicion of Beijing’s 
emboldened fishing activity in the Gulf of Tonkin and military gesturing in the Spratly and Paracel 
Islands remained high. From the point of normalisation, Vietnam’s commitment to its SCS claims has 
continued to be unwavering but with some exceptions, carefully checked so as not to derail the 
economic and party legitimacy rewards of cooperating with China. After 2005 however and despite 
the mounting collection of collaboration pacts and economic agreements, Vietnam in rhetoric and 
policy has gone out of its way much more to vocalise and push back on its territorial interests. By 
deliberate calibration or reactionary accident, Hanoi’s recent management of China in the SCS 
suggests a shift in strategic tack.  
Even as Vietnamese officials busied themselves with delegation exchanges and diplomatic 
restoration with China, during talks of the boundary terms of the maritime delimitation in 2000, 
opinion that Vietnam was being too lenient were widespread in the national media. Angered by 
small-scale incidents at sea and deep seated mistrust, attacks were directed namely at then General 
Party Secretary Le Kha Phieu.64 Although the precise terms of the Gulf of Tonkin Agreement have 
never been made public, a comprehensive spatial study of the agreement by academics at Durham 
University reveals China gained approximately 3200 nautical miles beyond the natural line of 
equidistance, for which the authors have no ready explanation.65 Already seen as the architect of 
Vietnam’s rejuvenated pro-Beijing policies, rumours in Vietnam’s diplomatic circles that Phieu had 
instructed negotiators to concede territory in the Gulf of Tonkin prompted party delegates to hastily 
ditch him in the wake of the VCP’s ninth Congress in 2001.66  
In 2005, the VCP Central Committee’s 4th plenum seized the initiative to restake its sovereignty rights 
in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, unveiling a plan for their economic development with the 
“Maritime Strategy Towards the Year 2020" a move guaranteed to provoke consternation from 
China.67 Chinese pressure to sabotage the involvement of foreign companies in the project were 
publicly ignored by Vietnam but surely discussed in private.68 Partners or not, Thayer believes from 
this point it became clear to Hanoi that any attempt it made to press home its claims would always 
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be “hostage to China's opposition”, but stopped short of spelling out what the implications on 
existing policy were. 69 
He need not have bothered for in 2007, a tally of China-instigated actions which compounded an 
already heightened sense of Vietnamese threat perception, jolted Vietnam to up the ante. The 
unilateral Chinese declaration that it would officially administer the Paracels and Spratlies  via 
Hainan70 was punctuated with several daring PLAN naval exercises in the vicinity and the 
proliferating harassment of Vietnamese fisherman allegedly within Vietnam’s EEZ. Vietnam 
responded forcefully, announcing a wholesale refurbishing of its military forces. Between 2004 and 
2013, Vietnam inflated its defence expenditure by 113%, the largest increase of any ASEAN 
member71. The Vietnam Ministry of Defence also closed a deal worth $3.2bn with Russia in 2009 to 
take delivery of 6 Kilo-Class submarines by 2017, a big ticket programme to deter China’s 
expeditionary naval capabilities.72 From 2009, Hanoi has also openly courted military cooperation 
with Washington, inviting annual naval simulations with the U.S. Navy around the port of Danang 
and aligning strongly with anti-China US statements.73  
In the run up to 2010 cooperation between Vietnam and China began to fade more evidently. 
Engagements in the DOC framework disintegrated (a China-ASEAN DOC working group were 
reported to have met only four times by this point)74 while Vietnam used its 2010 Chairship of 
ASEAN to condemn China’s SCS activities and drive the issue to the top of the agenda. In retaliation 
for China leaking that the SCS constituted one of its core national interests75, in 2011, Vietnam took 
the decision to formally call out Beijing’s activity in the SCS archipelagos as a major national security 
threat.76 The upgrade was commensurate with a Central Committee-issued maritime security 
document the same year, outlining concrete defence measures to protect Vietnam’s territorial 
stakes in the SCS, unquestionably targeted at Beijing. In a sign of political cohesion, the National 
Assembly passed the Law of the Sea in 2012 to rebuff Chinese territorial claims. Viewed largely as a 
public relations exercise to appease escalating pressure at home, the move was immediately met 
with anger from China who responded by promptly raising the administrative status of the Spratly 
and Paracels from county to prefere rank.77  
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The biggest break in Sino-Vietnamese friendship came in 2014 after China floated floated the state-
owned, Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig into Vietnam’s EEZ off the southern tip of the Paracels. The 
manoeuvre might have been part of a SCS grand strategy to intimidate Vietnam or possibly a cynical 
gambit to create friction ahead of the incoming CPV elections. Irrespective, a public backlash at 
home resulted in a string of government-approved and well publicised anti-China protests across the 
country. The ensuing riots around Saigon which led to the burning of Chinese-owned factories was 
an unusually violent outburst and almost definitely not sanctioned by Hanoi.78 The additional gutting 
of Taiwanese and Singaporean factories caught in the cross-fire was an immense embarrassment for 
the Government and justified a furious reaction from Beijing.  
 
Chapter 5 Explaining Vietnam’s management 
of China in the SCS  
 
 
The PRC has expressed its rights to the Spratly Islands and particularly, the Paracels in a consistent 
manner since almost its very creation in 1949. It has held fast to an ambiguous but (for Vietnam) 
antagonising “9 dashed” map even throughout a period of relatively relaxed and even strengthening 
bilateral relations. Notwithstanding China’s swift arrival on the global stage, and its growing levels of 
economic interdependence with Vietnam, there does not appear to have been any cataclysmic 
reorientation of the China-Vietnam balance of power. China for instance has and will remain for 
many decades to come, the vastly superior military and economic player and Vietnam the vastly 
inferior to this assymetric relationship. How therefore are we to explain the renewed tendency 
displayed in the mid-2000s by Vietnam to confront China’s sovereignty claims and risk destabilising 
what has been by in large a mutually beneficial system of cooperation for Vietnam.   
The key lies, as this paper has argued in understanding the interplay between Vietnam’s domestic 
and foreign policy sphere. Classical perspectives, as we have seen, have proven unable to properly 
incorporate the role of the VCP without first constructing a rigid and well-worn rationalist definition 
of ends that makes no distinction between the party’s and the state’s national interests. In Kissing 
Cousins: Nationalism and Realism for instance, John Mearsheimer is adamant that foreign policy 
elites do not have a say on the direction of foreign policy arguing the specific interests of individuals 
are outmatched by the power of ‘national identity’ and  ‘common destiny’ to survive.79 John Owen’s 
celebrated ‘ideas-power nexus’ goes as far as to say that ideas and values like ‘cultural autonomy’ or 
the desire for ‘self-government’ are at play in international politics.80 These are at best however 
either consciously or unconsciously accompanied by the inevitable hard or soft power interests of 
the state. Consequently, the aggregated preferences of decision-makers, expressed foremost via the 
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“right to an independent statehood” only have political significance in the international not the 
domestic arena.81  
When applied to the experience of Vietnam, these enduring realist interpretations of foreign policy 
making signal the triumph of realpolitik over the many components that make up the VCP making 
the exercise appear redundant. It is not surprising then that few scholars concerned with 
Vietnamese foreign policy have bothered to appropriate existing theory. 
But if these theories were true, we might expect to see examples of Vietnam continuing to exhibit a 
cool but measured and unified commitment to balance or as Thayer reminds us, to cooperate and 
struggle rather than to doggedly pursue one priority with China above the other for long periods. We 
have already witnessed the intricacies and nuances of decision-making within the VCP and how 
assumptions of homogeneity are askew from the practical reality of Vietnamese politics. With that in 
mind, Vietnam’s recent turn of resistance to Chinese power in the maritime zone can ultimately, 
only be explained not as the result of a carefully calculated balancing act as classical schools would 
have it, but rather as an improvised product of a single party state system divided among itself. We 
now need to draw on alternative theories to infuse with and ground the observations on Vietnam’s 
SCS conduct we see occurring beneath the state level. 
The importance of domestic factors for a state’s foreign policy has been expounded on by a long list 
of academics who identify political accountability, mass opinion and election cycles as implicating 
executive strategies. The VCP may not be worried by elections or political scrutiny in the same way 
Western democracies are, but as the sole representative of the state and its citizens, the VCP must 
still broker foreign policies that both enhance its international standing and consolidate legitimacy at 
home. This must be the case in the sight of both ideologically-vested  party elites and the nations’ 
provincially elected lawmakers for the VCP to fulfil its obligations. Viewed this way, foreign policy 
need not simply be a blunt tool for capturing given national-interests but also a means of cementing 
governance at home and protecting national constructions of Vietnam’s socialist heritage.  
Peter Katzenstein explains that investigating the identity and values of policy elites is critical because 
the state is inherently a social not rational actor – equally malleable by interactions in the domestic 
and international realm.82 “Social rules and conventions”83 govern self-interests and motivate actors 
at the sub-state level for which Vietnam’s reignited nationalism-oriented foreign policy towards 
China is a case in point. Jack Snyder and Karen Ballantine’s “marketplace of ideas” theory is too 
highly applicable to Sino-Vietnamese relations. The  paradigm depicts a contest between opposing 
domestic groups to dominate the popular narrative. It holds valuable explanatory power for how 
and why factions within the VCP are simultaneously mobilised to embrace and confront China in the 
nation’s foreign policy direction.84  
In 2015, in the wake of the Haiyang Shiyou 981 standoff, the Pew Research Centre found that 
Vietnamese public opinion of China at 19% was the lowest of all 10 Asian nations surveyed save for 
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Japan’s 9% and well under the 57% average Asian approval ratings85. Due to a gap in historical data, 
these indicators do not, on their own allow us to draw out correlation patterns with China or 
Vietnam’s behaviour over time. They are nevertheless proof of the domestic pressures under which 
VCP politicians operate.  
An insightful article compiled by political intelligence firm Stratfor reported that growing anti-China 
sentiment has been mirrored among certain factions within the top of the VCP and Government. It 
claimed that since 2006 especially and the entry of Prime Minister Dung, Vietnam's senior leadership 
could be approximately divided into two broad camps.86 On the one side, pro-Western and 
economic reformists (until his departure in 2016, led by PM Dung) have been against acquiescing to 
Beijing’s flexing in the SCS. On the other side, a pro-China conservative grouping can be identified, 
generally thought of as preferring ideological solidarity with China and concerned more with VCP 
regime stability. This faction was represented by former General Secretary Nong Duc Manh (oft 
rumoured to be the son of Vietnam’s founder Ho Chi Minh) 87 and since 2011 by General Secretary 
Nguyen Phu Trong. To this characterisation can be added, a moderate wing of general improvers 
formerly overseen by ex-President Truong Tan Sang.  
In 2011, a BBC article hinted at internal struggle within the VCP and  rivalry between President Sang 
and Prime Minister Dung. Both are southerners and have been portrayed as being pitted against, 
General Secretary Trong, a northerner. This revelation coincided with Vietnam’s heating 
confrontations of China and a surge of the reformist wing which Stratfor attributed to economic 
growth in the south and a spike in nationalist sentiment. It is widely believed that Trong’s 
background as a loyal communist and party member for 50 years makes him at least ideologically 
sympathetic towards Beijing and has as a result led to perceptions of him being too soft amid SCS 
clashes.88 On the other hand, during his tenure, Prime Minister Dung enacted a series of economic 
reforms aimed at drawing EU and US finance and is credited with having championed Vietnam’s 
inclusion in the U.S. Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP). Amid the Haiyang 981 incident, of all the VCP 
troika, Dung took the most nationalist stance, striking a chord with the the public. Dung’s domestic 
popularity for his anti-China responses also helped him weather two VCP attempts to unseat him. 
His ideological angst at China could also explain the PM’s ardent backing for Vietnam’s military 
upgrade programme. The pro-West emphasis placed on statecraft over socialist ideology during the 
period of frayed relations with China was further believed to resound with the composition of the 
Central Committee. 
Vietnamese leaders are torn between instinctively, almost by requirement, being sensitive to signs 
of Chinese expansionism across the seaboard but also paying homage to the ideological bondship 
and economic exchange with their communist neighbour. Although the exact ratios these factors 
hold over Vietnam’s management of China may never be scientifically quantified, suffice it to say 
that together they have been key determinants for Vietnam’s increasingly incensed responses to 
Chinese territorial assertiveness during the last decade.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
The “tyranny of geography”89 and age-old cultural ties mean that for Vietnam and the VCP, 
appropriately dealing with its powerful and ascending neighbour has always and will continue to be 
a chief if not the primary foreign policy concern.  
China and Vietnam began 2000 on friendly terms, raising hopes for the realisation of steadying 
bilateral ties and potentially the addressing or even resolution of longstanding overlapping SCS 
sovereignty claims. Yet by 2005 signs emerged that economic links and political goodwill were 
insufficient to prevent a downward spiral that has in recent years been at the same time 
symptomatic of and incentive for a defiant recalibration in Vietnam’s approach towards China.  
Originally vested in collaborative foreign and economic policies, Vietnam has over time come to rely 
less on the security of China’s words, putting itself on the strategic front foot as it grapples to 
contain expanding perceived challenges to its territorial integrity. Conditioned by a long and 
carefully fashioned national memory of both Chinese aggression and assistance, the assurances of 
Sino-Vietnamese summits; regular state visits, and ACFTA have not been enough to dispel fears of a 
hegemon bent on regional domination during the last few years.  
The relative dearth in up-to-date studies of Vietnam’s management of sovereignty issues with China 
and Vietnamese-centric SCS research may already be stemming valuable insights into appropriate 
and effective peace building measures. 
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